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LIMITATIONS ON- CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER
RULE 10b-5
DAVID S. RUDER* & NEIL S. CROSS*
Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 has become well
known as providing broad and important remedies for aggrieved
investors.' After avoiding rule lOb-5 for many years, the Supreme
,Court has recently construed the rule in several decisions. 2 The Court
has recognized that an implied private right to enforce rule lOb-5
exists, stating in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas-
ualty Co.3 that "[i]t is now established that a private right of action
is implied under Section 10(b)."I The Court's general approval of rule
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1951, Williams College;
J.D. 1957, University of Wisconsin.
** Member, Class of 1973, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the 1934 Act] provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as rule lob-5] promulgated under section 10(b)
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(i) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The first Supreme Court decision interpreting
rule 1Ob-5 was SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The Court heard a prior case
involving rule lob-5 but did not interpret the rule. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967).
3. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
4. Id. at 13 n.9, citing VI L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (1969); III Loss,
supra, at 1763 et seq. (2d ed. 1961). For a discussion of the development of implied private
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lOb-5 is apparent from the following statements interpreting the rule
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States:'
[T]he 1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a "funda-
mental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosuire for the philos-
ophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics
in the securities industry."6 ...Congress intended securities legislation en-
acted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed "not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.",
This article identifies several areas in which the interpretation of
facts can serve as a device for limiting liability under rule 1Ob-5 and
advances theories for proper legal analysis of those areas. The areas
discussed include materiality, reliance, causation, scienter and stat-
utes of limitation-legal aspects of a rule lOb-5 cause of action which
require factual findings to be made to.' The article concludes that
right theories, see Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial
Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413 (1972), and
articles cited in Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary
Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1289-90 n.4 (1971).
5. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
6. Id. at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
7. Id., quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 195, and noting
the subsequent approval of similar language in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
8. Although the general analysis in this article will not be specifically directed to aspects
of the securities laws other than rule lOb-5, some of the discussion will be applicable to the
development of remedies in other acts. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970), has been interpreted in many recent decisions to permit private
actions to enforce fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.
1971); Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), affd in part and modified, 445 F.2d
369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). Brouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961), vacated as moot upon
settlement, 369 U.S. 424 (1962), apparently reached an opposite result, but the Eighth Circuit
has indicated its desire to disavow Brouk. See Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783
(8th Cir. 1967). See generally Note, Private Rights ofAction Against Mutual Fund Investment
Advisers: Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 143 (1971). Margin
regulations are also privately enforceable. See. e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder and German, 429
F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'g and remanding, 295 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Serzysko
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). The trend appears to be toward permitting private enforce-
ment of stock exchange rules and the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers.
For an early leading case discussing the problem of private enforcement of such rules, see
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966). For cases in the Seventh Circuit indicating the trend toward private enforcement, see
SEC v. First Sec. Co., 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that NASD rule 27 is privately
enforceable), reprinted in 1972 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,430; Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415
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